

## Research Paper



# THE DIVERGING CLASHES OF NEURO-PHILOSOPHICAL VIEWPOINTS ON QUALITATIVE PROPERTIES OF CONSCIOUSNESS

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## ABSTRACT

The research study is an exploration on the diverging neuro-philosophical viewpoints on consciousness that inevitably clashes one another as it poses unresolved queries on mind-body problem. Each school of thought exemplified consciousness on a heightened sphere causing destabilization and failure of convergence. This study depicts the viewpoints of epiphenomenalism, functionalism, eliminativism, dualism, representationalism, interactionism, parallelism, physicalism, and other related viewpoints. The study focuses on qualia epiphenomenalism. The study was conducted to the children of, ordinary women farm workers not necessarily indigenous workers, of legal age, studying at Aklan State University, simply to assess their reactions/understanding to the above stated viewpoints.

A plausible scientific paradigm of consciousness has been repudiated on the basis that attached to consciousness are qualia which are amenable to any scientific paradigm. What is missing in the previous endeavors, in neuro-philosophy, to endow an empirical context for qualia is that no authentic paradigm of research on consciousness has been advanced from the findings of researches and consequential experiments in neuroscience.

Since qualitative properties are not causally efficacious other properties may be causally efficacious. There is congruence on the probability to adhere to irreducibility with respect to other properties. Thus, there is probability that the intentional properties are irreducible and epiphenomenal. They have no function in engendering the instantiation of intentional properties. In this sphere, beliefs/memories about epiphenomenal qualitative properties do not emerge due to epiphenomenal qualitative properties. These beliefs/memories in qualitative properties may happen without the occurrence of the corresponding qualitative properties. So, beliefs/memories must be both authentic and justified to be considered as knowledge. These beliefs/memories about epiphenomenal qualitative properties cannot be considered as knowledge and these epiphenomenal qualitative properties do not consist the possibility for cognition.

**KEYWORDS:** qualia-epiphenomenalism, neuro-philosophical, consciousness, physicalism, representationalism

## INTRODUCTION

Neuroscience is the study of the nervous system, configuring the brain, the spinal cord, and the networks of neurons throughout the body. Through their research, neuroscientists is indicative of the human brain and how it functions; assess how the nervous system unfolds in a process, matures, and sustains itself through life, and discover modes to prevent or cure many neurological and psychiatric disorders. Moreover, neuroscientists study genes and other molecules whose function is grounded on the nervous system, individual neurons, and ensembles of neurons that is constitutive of the human system and behavior.

Neuro-philosophy is the philosophical interpretation and application of neuro-scientific concepts, discoveries, and results of research and experiments in neuroscience in addressing traditional philosophical query's (Bickle et al. 2010). Georg Northoff (2004,92) elucidates that the term 'neuro-philosophy' is often indicated either implicitly or explicitly to characterize the investigation of philosophical paradigms and positions in connection to neuro-scientific hypothesis in the attempt to proffer solutions to some problems in philosophy. Although the exact methodological principles and systematic rules for neuro-philosophy remain to be clarified (Northoff 2004, 91-127), it accentuates on the



indispensability and worthwhileness of the empirical facts about the brain – what it is and how it works – as resources needed in resolving some fundamental problems or query's in the Philosophy of Mind. Thus, for example, the neuro-philosophers centered exclusively on ways in which the 'new knowledge' about the brain and its properties emerging from neuroscience illuminates philosophical debates about the nature of consciousness and its engagement to physical mechanisms. J. Prinz (2007) and Owen Flanagan (2009) demonstrated, in separate articles, addressed query's, such as "What is the neural ground of moral cognition?" or "What is the neural basis of happiness?" and endowed examples of neuro-philosophy, where answers to these query's are constrained by the findings in exploring neuroscience. Neuro-philosophy is already breaking new grounds in philosophical research. For instance, there are branches of neuro-philosophy such as neuro-epistemology (Churchland 2004, 42-50) and neuro-ethics (Levy 2008, 1-5), which are springing from contemporary discourse in the Philosophy of Mind. This is in confirmation of Ned Block's (2003, 1328) presupposition that neuro-philosophy intends to depict that findings in cognitive science and neuroscience allow development and advancement where development was deemed impossible on the amplified problems of philosophy.

A common error in neuro-philosophy is that most of the hypothesis on, and explications of, consciousness are directed at consciousness as functions, processes, reports or outcomes of some intricate entangling neuro-biological entities or properties. As Chalmers (1996, xi-xvi) accentuated, problems attached with the notion of consciousness as functions or processes of the human brain were alluded to as the easy problems of consciousness. They are easy problems because there are mechanisms and principles of unfolding hypotheses, paradigms, etc. for grappling consciousness in this concern. What is difficult or a hard problem, in Chalmer's usage of representation, is the necessity to endow a neuro-philosophical account or expounding of qualia, which are phenomenal properties of consciousness. Chalmers elucidates that neuro-philosophy cannot address the hard problem.

It is germane to decide whether neuro-qualia, the interaction between a specific neurotransmitter and an identified receptor, is appropriate to the depiction of qualia as the dualist attempts to contextualize it. For, if the neuro-qualia diverged from the dualist's quale, the arguments between them would be not necessarily about the convergence of things and there would be no real disagreements. One way to do this is to argue that since the interaction of the neurochemicals (neurotransmitters and receptors) are peculiar to their owners. This exemplifies the subjectivity of neuro-qualia, which is also a worthwhile characteristic of qualia. It demonstrates the necessity to ascribe that 'subjectivity' as an essential characteristic of qualia also characterizes neuro-qualia.

In concurrence to the characteristic of qualia is that they are perspectively or indispensably subjective. This is indicative on the aspect that the feature of pain – that what it is like to feel pain – implies that there is a subject that feels the pain and that, for that subject, there is what it is like to feel pain (Tye 1999, 708) puts it differently by saying: Knowing what it is like to feel pain demands one to consist a certain experiential presupposition or perspective, namely the one conferred upon one by being the object of the pain. This is why a person born without the capacity to feel pain and kept alive in a very carefully constrained environment is

constitutive of negative knowledge or apprehension of what it is like to experience pain.

This demonstrates that the capacity to feel pain is prior to having what it is like to feel pain. In Norman Malcolm's (1998, 148) construal of Thomas Nagel, the constitution of the capacity to feel pain seems to demand the presence of an experiential presupposition. Such perspective is envisioned in the neuro-identity hypothesis. It is explicated by the neurochemical interactions in the central nervous system of the person that feels the pain. The argument indicates that since it is because a person is undergoing an experience of pain, that she comprises an indispensable viewpoint or supposition of the pain, and to undergo an experience of pain is explicated by the neurochemical interactions going on in one's central nervous system.

Since the neurochemical interactions in the central nervous system is experienced by the person that constitutes them, the subjectivity of what it is like to feel pain is implicitly expounded by the subjectivity of the neurochemical interactions in the central nervous system. Moreover, if neuro-qualia are identical with the neurochemical interactions, then neuro-qualia also contributes perspectival subjectivity as qualia did. The neurochemical interaction in each individual is in fact not in conjunction and is peculiar to the being in whose body the interaction occurs, suggest that the neurochemical interaction in each individual is also distinctively subjective to the owner. If given the neuro-identity hypothesis, neuro-qualia are neurochemical interactions, and neurochemical interactions are subjective to the owner, then neuro-qualia are subjectively constituted by the person in whom the neurochemical interactions occurs.

The context of subjectivity indicative in the character of qualia demonstrates that given human comprehensive understanding of the neurochemical organs and neurochemical properties that exemplify the neural experience of a human being, the subjective character of the mental experience could be objectively represented. This is what being depicted through the neuro-identity hypothesis, which elucidates neuro-qualia as the neurochemical interactions in the central nervous system of human beings. Also the hypothesis that neuro-qualia are synonymous to the neurochemical interactions in the human brain is appropriately speculated by R.W. Sperry's (1965,8): The very core of the argument is that unique patterning of cerebral excitation (i.e., the neurochemical interactions and processes in the neurobiological entities such as the central nervous system that generates pain instead of something else. It is the overall functional property of this pain pattern that is critical in the causal sequence of brain affairs. It is the over all pattern consequence in brain dynamic that is the pain quality of inner experience. As Sperry asserts, the neurochemical interactions and processes are fundamental in the exploration of grappling qualia, the conscious quality of mental experience.

Qualia was introduced in 1929 by C.S. Lewis in his argument of sense data theory. For Lewis, qualia were properties of sense data themselves. In contemporary usage, it alludes generally to properties of experience. Paradigm of experiences with qualia are perceptual experiences (comprising non-veridical perceptual experiences like hallucinations) and bodily sensations (such as pain, hunger, itching). Emotions like anger, envy or fear and moods, like euphoria, or even anxiety are also usually considered to have qualitative aspects.

Frequently, qualia are considered as the phenomenal properties of experience and experiences that have qualia are phenomenally conscious. Phenomenal consciousness is often contrasted with intentionality, i.e., the representational aspects of mental states. Some mental states, e.g., perceptual experiences constitute both phenomenal and intentional aspects. The nature of the relationship between phenomenal consciousness and intentionality has recently generated considerable philosophical argumentation.

Some philosophers envision phenomenal consciousness as reducible to intentional content. While others negate such a claim. From the standpoint of introspection, the existence of qualia seems indisputable. Indeed, it has proved remarkably difficult to accommodate qualia within the physicalist account of the mind. Many philosophers have argued that qualia cannot be identified with or reduced to anything physical and that any attempted explanation of the world in solely physicalist terms would leave qualia out. Thus, over the last several decades, qualia have been the source of considerable controversy in philosophy of mind.

One of the most fundamental queries about the mind is the consideration of its relationship to the body (and, more specifically, its relationship to the brain). This has become known as the mind-body problem. Although it dates back at least to Plato's *Phaedo*, the problem was thrust into philosophical prominence of Rene Descartes. In his book '*Meditations on First Philosophy*', Descartes ascribed to a dualist perspective according to which the mind and the body are fundamentally different kinds of things: whereas the body is a material thing existing in space, the mind is an immaterial thing, one that altogether lacks spatial extension. In contrast to dualists, the *materialists* fostered the assertion that everything that exists must be made of matter. Historically, one of the proponents of materialism was Thomas Hobbes. In the threshold of the twentieth century, this perspective was known as *physicalism*, the elucidation that everything that exists—all things and all properties of things—must fundamentally be physical. A number of philosophers today endorse some form of physicalism.

There are three basic kinds of dualism: first, substance dualism (fostered by Descartes) wherein mental substances are different from physical substances. Not only are the properties of the mental state are different from the properties of the physical state but they are made of different thing. Second, property dualism wherein the qualitative nature of consciousness is different from merely physical states. It is emergent from these physical states but not the same. Here, some objects, e.g., brain, can have physical mental features, but when the object ceases to exist so do its mental features. Third, Predicate wherein mind predicate is necessary for a complete theory of the world. Mental predicates cannot be reduced to physical predicates, e.g., water (H<sub>2</sub>O vs. pain – firing of c-fibres).

The argument for dualism is qualia and parapsychology. The latter refers to question concerning the evidence for effects of mental abuse that is beyond the laws of physics. But if these seems to be, the question is, is that evidence for dualism or a need to revise the laws of physics.

The argument against dualism: first, the neural dependence of all known mental phenomena including the most basic to what it is to be a conscious person. Second, explanatory power – poses the queries such as: what detailed characteristics of mental states have been explained by a well

work-out dualist theory. Third, evolution – the question such as: how does gradual natural selection led to something non-physical into existence?

## QUALIA-EPIPHENOMENALISM

Qualia–Epiphenomenalism adheres to qualitative goals of events (such as sense organs, mental impulses, muscle contractions) that of excruciating pains, pangs of jealousy or anger, smelling flowers/perfumes, hearing an instrumental music, seeing panoramic landscapes, or about the characteristic experience of tasting spicy foods, etc., lack causal efficacy or devoid of causal divergence to what we endeavor but are causal with respect to mental events (thought, consciousness, cognitions).

In Epiphenomenalism, the physical world is causally closed, the mental cannot influence the physical. Mental events are by-product of physical experience. Epiphenomenalism is in contrast to interactionism. Mental events are caused by physical events but not vice versa. Interactionists reacted to the above view and would rather favor “Interactionism” wherein mind and body influence each other or the mental can influence the physical (e.g., intending to lift your arm) and the physical can influence the mental (perception). To at least some degree mental states can cause physical states and vice versa.

Some philosophers further negated the above argument and would rather subscribed to the so-called “Parallelism” wherein mental events and physical events are in a kind of continual harmony but neither causes the other. But Monists vehemently upholds Monism arguing that first, for idealism: only mind exists. Everything is mental. Second, physicalism (materialism): only the physical world exists. Everything is physical. Third, identity theory wherein the mental states are physical states of the brain. The argument are as follows: first, Mental states can cause physical events. Second, the physical world is causally closed. Third, therefore, mental states are physical states.

Functionalists, however, efficaciously objected all the above arguments upholding instead the notion “Functionalism” wherein mental states are functional states (software compared to hardware). Argument against: first, inverted spectra: could not my red quale be like your blue quale while our red mental states have the same functional roles and our blue mental states have the same functional roles? Second, zombies – could there not be a system with all the right functional relationship but just no qualia

The Physicalists, however, turned down such argument and adhered instead to “Physicalism” wherein it is essentially the metaphysical claim that everything is physical. It is distinguished from materialism (everything is matter) by the fact that physicalists include such entities as energy, magnetism, gravity, etc. which we agree are physical but it is not clear that they are made of matter.

Some philosophers fosters consciousness as can be accommodated within a physicalist image such as our accessibility, report on, and attend to our own mental states. It seems logical to assume that as neuroscience advances and we learn more and more about the brain, and expound on such competences from the standpoint of neural mechanisms. David Chalmers alluded to this as the *easy (relative term) problems of consciousness*. What makes the problems easy is that, even though the solutions to these problems probably still require decades or even centuries of difficult empirical investigation, we can solve it using the standard methods of

cognitive science and neuroscience. (Chalmers 1995, 1996) Solving the problem of attention, for example, simply awaits the empirical identification of a significant neural mechanism. But what sort of mechanism could account for qualia? We have the impression that the physical system of the brain gives rise to qualia, but we lack understanding of how it does so. The problem of accounting for qualia Chalmers noted is the *hard problem of consciousness*.

Joseph Levine responded to the so-called hard problem of consciousness as related to the *explanatory gap*. Given the scientific identification of heat with the motion of molecules, there is no further explanation that needs to be given: “our knowledge of chemistry and physics makes intelligible how it is that something like the motion of molecules could play the causal role we associate with heat. . . . Once we understand how this causal role is carried out there is nothing more we need to understand.” (Levine 1983) In contrast, concerning pain, we precisely identify the neural mechanism that accounts for pain such as C-fiber firing, yet, a further question would remain: Why does our experience of pain feel the way that it does? Why does C-fiber firing feel like *this*, rather than like *that*, or rather than nothing at all? Identifying pain with C-fiber firing fails to provide us with a complete account of the identification of heat with the motion of molecules. Some philosophers argue that closing the explanatory gap and fully accounting for qualia is not merely hard but rather inconceivable, or qualia.

Heated debates about qualia focused its argumentation on functionalism in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Before, the debate was centered on identity theory. The functionalist view maintains that the function of a mental state is its defining feature. Mental states are defined in terms of the causal role that they play in the entire system of the mind—that is, in terms of their causal connections to sensory stimuli, behavioral outputs, and other mental states. This sort of definition allows functionalism to evade several objections aimed at philosophical behaviorism, an early 20th century theory of mental states alluding to their input-output relations. Instead of defining pain in terms of C-fiber firing, functionalism defines pain in terms of the causal role it plays in our mental life: causing avoidance behavior, warning us of danger, etc., in reply to certain environmental stimuli.

The absent qualia objection and the inverted qualia objection specifically targeted functionalism, but could be generally applied to physicalism profoundly. The general problem that qualia pose for physicalism is exemplified in Thomas Nagel’s seminal paper, “What is it like to be a Bat?” (Nagel 1974). Although it might be that not all living creatures have phenomenal experiences, we can be pretty confident that bats do—after all, they are mammals who engage in fairly sophisticated behavior. In Nagel’s words, there is something that it is like to be a bat. But the physiology of bats is radically different from the physiology of human beings, and the way they interact with the world is radically different from the way that we interact with the world. What we do via vision, they do via echolocation (sonar). We detect objects by sight; bats detect objects by sending out high-frequency signals and detecting the reflections from nearby objects. Because this way of perceiving the world is so different from our own, it seems that their perceptual experiences must be vastly different from our own—so different, in fact, that Nagel argues that it is unimaginable from our perspective. We, who are not bats, cannot know what it is like to be a bat. Qualia are

inherently subjective, and as such, Nagel argues that they cannot be accommodated by physicalism: “Every subjective phenomenon is essentially connected with a single point of view, and it seems inevitable that an objective, physical theory will abandon that point of view.” (Nagel 1974, 520)

Related difficulty presented about physicalism and qualia have been forcefully advanced by Frank Jackson in his thought experiment involving Mary, a brilliant scientist who has spent her entire life in a black-and-white room. (Jackson 1982) Although she has normal color vision, her confinement has prevented her from ever having any color sensations. While in the room, Mary has studied color science through black and white textbooks, television, etc. And in that way she has learned the complete physical story about color experience, including all the physical facts about the brain and its visual system. She knows all the physical facts about color. But she has never seen anything in color. Now suppose that Mary is one day released from her room and presented with a ripe tomato. What should we imagine happens? Most people have the very strong intuition that Mary learns something from this perceptual experience. “Aha!” she might say. “Now I finally know what the color red is like.”

Patricia Churchland reply to the thought experiment of Jackson: “How can I assess what Mary will know and understand if she knows *everything* there is to know about the brain? Everything is a lot, and it means, in all likelihood, that Mary has a radically different and deeper understanding of the brain than anything barely conceivable in our wildest flights of fancy.” (P.S. Churchland 1986, 332; see also Dennett 1991, 399-400)

While functionalism and physicalism are fostered as general paradigms of mind, representationalism intends specifically to offer an account of qualia. In this assertion, the qualitative character of our phenomenal mental states depends on the intentional content of such states. Representationalist philosophers characterize this dependence as *weak representationalism* alluding to supervenience. The qualitative character of our mental states supervenes on the intentional content of those states (that is, if two experiences are alike representationally, then they are alike phenomenally). *Strong (or pure) representationalism* makes a further claim: The qualitative character of our mental states *constitutes* the intentional composition of such states. Strong representationalism thus offers a theory of qualia—it attempts to expound what qualitative character is.

Some philosophers, however, repudiated the existence of qualia. This presupposition is known as *eliminativism* about qualia, and it commonly constitutes a part of a larger eliminativist project about mental states in general. For example, Paul and Patricia Churchland have argued (both together and individually) that as we gain more and more neuroscientific understanding of our mental lives, we will come to see that our current mental state concepts—belief, pain, sensation, qualia, etc.—all need to be discarded. Another philosopher in the person of Dennett concludes that, our conception of qualia is so confused that it would be “tactically obtuse” to try to salvage the notion; rather, we should just admit that “there simply are no qualia at all.” (Dennett 1988)

There is further option available to philosophers when confronting the hard problem of consciousness. Without repudiating the reality of qualia, one might simply accept that they resist reduction in physical, functional, or representational terms and embrace some form of dualism.

This is David Chalmers' own approach to the hard problem. Because he believes that we can account for phenomenal consciousness within a solely natural framework known as *naturalistic dualism*.

Here, Chalmers' alluded to Descartes' dualism as a version of *substance dualism*. Descartes upholds that, the mind is an immaterial substance existing independently of the body. In contrast, Chalmers' dualism is a version of property dualism. This presupposition does not adhere to the existence of any nonphysical or immaterial substances, but instead posits the existence of properties—qualia—that are ontologically independent of any physical properties. Though these properties are not entailed by physicalism (that is, though they do not logically supervene on physical properties) they may nonetheless somehow stem from them. In Chalmers' description: consciousness stems from a physical substrate in virtue of certain contingent laws of nature, which are not themselves implied by physical laws." (Chalmers 1996, 125)

### **MAJOR CONTENTIONS - QUALIA- EPIPHENOMENALISM**

Our behavior is influenced by our desires and emotive spheres. We desire jewelry and so we purchase one. When we experience a vehicular accident or a toothache, we feel excruciating pain. Why do we need to consider qualia-epiphenomenalism? Leading qualia-epiphenomenalists such as Gadenne and Robinson uphold the following principles (Gadenne, 2006, Robinson, 2004): first, physical causal completeness (i.e., physical effects, including behavioral effects), every event comprises substantial physical cause; second, irreducibility i.e., divergence of qualitative properties of events to physical properties of events; finally, principle of causal exclusion stressing that there can be no more than a single sufficing cause for any given effect.

The fusion of the above principle engenders qualia-epiphenomenalism. Diverging versions of epiphenomenalism are as follows: first, classical epiphenomenalism, focuses on the doctrine that mental properties lack causal efficacy accentuating that mental properties of events comprises no possibility of having physical or mental effects components. Second, physical effect epiphenomenalism stressing the doctrine that mental properties of events provides no causal influence on any physical effects. Mental events are totally dependent on physical functions configuring no independent existence or causal efficacy. It is a sort of overflow incapable of causing anything physical. We have non-physical properties.

The fulcrum of discussion on the term 'events' in this paper contains four diverging properties. Events configures physical properties, functional properties (such as the causal linkage they listen to other events), intentional or direct properties, and qualitative properties such as what this event feels like for the subject. For example, it's summer. I felt so warm when suddenly someone uttered, 'there's ice cream in the container on the table'. Such causes an event to occur in me. This event comprises qualitative properties (feelings of relief and excitement). It consists intentional properties (my excitement is about, or particularly directed at, the ice cream). It contains functional properties (the presence of ice cream particularly causes mouth preparation and ice cream pursuit behavior). It also configures physical properties (neural/chemical reactions) cascade throughout my brain.

The accentuation of this paper is on the context of property epiphenomenalism (Jackson, 1982) wherein mental

properties of events lack causal efficacy. Physical properties of events constitutes substantial causes of behavioral effects. On event epiphenomenalism (Robinson), physical events comprises sufficing causes of behavioral effects as mental events lack causal efficacy. Exception to this is the so-called interchangeability (cf. Staudacher, 2006, 155) wherein causation is an extensional engagement happening between events rather than on virtue, of properties of events. An epiphenomenalist of this form believes that mental properties of events lack efficacy but the event that configures mental property is causally efficacious.

### **THE EPISTEMIC ARGUMENT**

The vortex of discussion in this section is on unjustified intentional properties (i.e., beliefs/memories) concerning epiphenomenal qualitative properties. One common repudiation to qualia-epiphenomenalism is the epistemic argument accentuating that the loss of causal efficacy down grades our competence cognizing the epiphenomenal qualitative properties. We can grasp epiphenomenal properties insofar as physical properties cause the beliefs and memories in congruence to epiphenomenal qualitative properties.

Since qualitative properties are not causally efficacious other properties may be causally efficacious. There is congruence on the probability to adhere to irreducibility with respect to other properties. Thus, there is probability that the intentional properties are irreducible and epiphenomenal. They have no function in engendering the instantiation of intentional properties. In this sphere, belief/memories about epiphenomenal qualitative properties do not emerge due to epiphenomenal qualitative properties. These beliefs/memories in qualitative properties may happen without the occurrence of the corresponding qualitative properties. So, beliefs/memories must be both authentic and justified to be considered as knowledge. These beliefs/memories about epiphenomenal qualitative properties cannot be considered as knowledge and these epiphenomenal qualitative properties do not consist the possibility for cognition.

Inasmuch as qualitative properties are not causally efficacious it has no function in engendering the instantiation of intentional properties in the subject, i.e., beliefs/memories, concerning these qualitative properties. Inasmuch as beliefs/memories concerning qualitative properties failed to emerge due to epiphenomenal qualitative properties, these beliefs/memories concerning qualitative properties may take place even with the absence of the corresponding qualitative properties to take place, i.e., beliefs/memories concerning epiphenomenal qualitative properties are justified and with a high degree of probability false. Inasmuch as beliefs/memories concerning epiphenomenal qualitative properties cannot be regarded as knowledge and the unknowability of such epiphenomenal qualitative properties. Watkins argued: If qualia are not causally efficacious then my beliefs/memories would be just as they are whether these were qualia or not. Beliefs about qualia cannot be justified on account of qualitative properties since those experiences do not cause these beliefs.

The other version of the epistemic argument are as follows: first, the difficulty cognizing the qualitative properties due to their failure of influence on behavioral effects. This position is contradictory to qualia-epiphenomenalism, qualitative properties lack causal efficacy, thus, they cannot cause people to make utterances 'I am in excruciating pain' is not a basis for the emergence of the qualitative property of

excruciating pain, nor the sudden withdrawal of my fingers from flame as proof that a particularly unpleasant experience has taken place. This behavior stems in some source other than the feeling of excruciating pain, so the excruciating pain has no (causal) function with whether this behavior has taken place or not. For example: first, Muller (Muller, 2008) argues that it cannot be a basis for the existence of qualitative properties. Second, Campbell (Campbell, 2003) stated an example wherein Mary, the advanced scientist is an expert in the field of neuro-science but has never seen color, articulates upon being exposed to red for the first time is no basis she had qualitative experience of red. Third, Dennet (Dennet, 1991) argued that some behaviors might take place in the absence of qualitative properties of events thus there is no behavioral basis for qualitative properties. This considers the behavioral utterance 'I was in excruciating pain' unjustified, which impedes it from being tagged as knowledge.

Second, the other version of epistemic argument is the belief in epiphenomenalism as unjustified inasmuch as intentional properties lack causal efficacy. The belief in epiphenomenalism is a belief. For this belief to be regarded as knowledge, it must be both justified and true. How, then, is the belief in epiphenomenalism justified? Swinburne (Swinburne, 2011, 206-207) suggests and ultimately repudiates that epiphenomenalism maybe justified to appeal to experience, memory, and or testimony.

It is not common that we can experience our own beliefs failure to have any causal impact on our beliefs. Contiguously, we cannot appeal to our memory of how prior beliefs failed to have an impact because we never experienced these circumstances, nor would these prior memories cause us to believe (or have anything to do with our belief) on the failure of belief's efficacy. Rather, the belief on the absence of beliefs causal efficacy would stem from some brain event. And if one human is in this dire epistemic predicament, it is not fruitful to appeal to the testimony of another human who is in the same predicament. Swinburn's solution to this problem is to point out that epiphenomenalists justify their belief in epiphenomenalism through inference from the three antecedent beliefs depicted above.

As explicated above, the epiphenomenalist believes in epiphenomenalism because of the conjunction of the principles of physical causal completeness, irreducibility and causal exclusion. The epiphenomenalist insists on constituting inferential knowledge that epiphenomenalism is authentic, i.e., these three principles are propositions, and the epiphenomenalist holds a propositional attitude (i.e., belief) toward these propositions. The propositions that the epiphenomenalist adheres to logical engagement, so the epiphenomenalist claims from her three antecedent beliefs to the conclusion that epiphenomenalism is genuine. Robinson explored these three beliefs as leading to the belief in epiphenomenalism. Antony (Antony, 1989, 167-8) insists one believes in epiphenomenalism because of these reasons where the 'because' seems to be taken literally (i.e., seems to be the cause). On this paradigm we have causation in virtue of reasonableness. Brewer's contention is on logical conflict (Brewer, 1995, 244). One is an epiphenomenalist because the logical conjunction of the principles of physical causal completeness, irreducibility and causal exclusion compels them to believe in epiphenomenalism.

The classical epiphenomenal position is that these three antecedent beliefs lead to and hence justify, epiphenomenalism. Classical epiphenomenalist maintains that

no beliefs, including these three antecedent beliefs can lead to, or hence justify, any belief, including the belief in epiphenomenalism. Rather, their belief in epiphenomenalism emerges, as does every belief, because of brain events that are blind to the reasonableness or unreasonableness of the beliefs they subvene. Thus, the reasons that suggest epiphenomenalism (Robinson) are not actually the causes of someone becoming an epiphenomenalist and this leaves the belief in epiphenomenalism without sufficing justification and hence the belief cannot be counted as knowledge.

In concurrence to the above argument, Hyslop argues: if epiphenomenalism is true it would never be rational to believe it is true. Why is this? A rational belief is a belief maintained because of other beliefs we adhere to. If we did not maintain other beliefs we might well not adhere on to that belief. My belief that epiphenomenalism is true, cannot be linked in conjunction to the demands of other beliefs. It cannot then be rational. Since beliefs lack causal efficacy, the belief in physical causal completeness, irreducibility and causal exclusion is not logically coherent for the belief in epiphenomenalism, or the reason why someone upholds epiphenomenalism, and hence the belief in epiphenomenalism cannot be tagged as knowledge (Hyslop, 1998, 65-66).

Epiphenomenal qualitative properties are irrelevant to the occurrence of beliefs/memories about those experiences in fact, those same beliefs/memories may be in place in the absence of those experiences. But if I can believe that pineapples are sweet and have a memory that pineapples are sweet, even if the actual taste experience was sour, or there was no taste experience whatsoever, the belief that pineapples are sweet is unjustified and possibly false, and cannot be tagged as knowledge, while the quality of the experience is unknown.

### **THE COMMON CAUSES**

Epiphenomenal qualitative properties supervene (with nomological or metaphysical fact) upon the physical properties that cause the effect. Epiphenomenal qualitative properties are insignificant with its consequential happenings. Rather, qualitative properties albeit causally unrelated are still inextricably linked with the effect. In virtue of their supervenience in the cause of the effect and this intimate engagement is adequate to dispel any epistemic worries that qualia-epiphenomenalism grapples. There are three diverging responses:

First, Jackson argued on the linkage of behavioral effects to epiphenomenal qualitative properties i.e., movements on a theatre screen at one moment are related to the movements of theater screen moment later. The first moment (a punching, for example) causes to cause the second moment (a falling) but the first movement is caused by the projector, which also causes the second moment (Jackson, 1982, 133).

Qualia-epiphenomenalism maintains that epiphenomenal qualitative properties are the products of the same physical cause generating behavioral effect. The epiphenomenalist can appeal to the underlying causal processes to explicate the epiphenomenal qualitative properties are linked to these effects.

Second, Staudacher amplified Jackson's viewpoints by indicating the distinctions between direct (generative) and indirect (counterfactually dependent) cause (Staudacher, 2006, 156). Direct causes are either immediate causes of the effect or the configuration of the causal chain that stems to the effect. Indirect cause would be that the cause of A is also the cause of B. Beliefs/memories about past qualitative

experiences will have synonymous cause as the actual qualitative experiences: the belief would not be engendered if the fact hadn't obtained. This counterfactual dependency is substantial to dispel the epistemic argument above. So, we would not believe that we were in excruciating pain if the cause of the pain had not occurred as well. So, we are justified in believing we were in excruciating pain. Qualitative properties will only be indirect causes of the memories/belief about those qualitative properties if there is a sufficing stringent necessary linkage from the physical cause to the qualitative properties. Occurrent qualitative experiences are justified by acquaintance memories of past qualitative experiences are justified by appeal to common underlying causes.

The epiphenomenalist argues that mental properties lack causal efficacy. If they endorse the counterfactual paradigm of causation, mental properties will have causal efficacy and their position will be false. The epiphenomenalist repudiates mental causation because they believe by the authenticity of physical causal completeness, causal exclusion and irreducibility. If they endorse mental causation through counterfactual analysis of causation, they will have to negate the principle of causal exclusion.

Third, Gadenne adjunct crucial component to the viewpoint (Gadenne, 2004, 112, 161). Qualitative properties are properties of physical system. The linkage between qualitative properties and their underlying base is one of efficacious supervenience on dependence. This supervenience linkage grounds the psychophysical law concocting that whenever the physical cause occurs, the qualitative properties necessarily occurs as well. Thus, the counterfactual had not occurred the effect would not have occurred on the given circumstance. The efficacious supervenience linkage ensures that the belief/memory nomologically depends upon the past qualitative property. This nomological dependency ensures that we believe we were in excruciating pain only when one actually were in pain which dissipates any epistemic concerns.

### PROBLEMS

1. Muller – the problem emerges from the gap between, or the indirectness of the linkage between the belief 'I was in excruciating pain and the qualitative property of pain' (Muller, 2008, 86). If qualitative properties are causally efficacious, the causal linkage from the qualitative property to the effect is direct and immediate. If qualitative properties lack causal efficacy, there is no causal linkage from the epiphenomenal qualitative property to the belief about the qualitative property or there is a gap between the occurrence of the excruciating pain and the belief about the pain. The belief about the pain ensues from a physical cause, which determines that the pain will be present as well.

This gap enables the critic to render false the requisite counterfactual. Had the epiphenomenal mental property not occurred the effect would not have occurred. By demonstrating certain instances where the mental property does not occur but the effect still does. If this counterfactual fails, then the belief that 'I was in excruciating pain' can occur without any actual pain, so the belief that I was in pain cannot be tagged as knowledge.

2. Daniel Dennett – Is it possible for a belief about an epiphenomenal qualitative property to occur without the occurrence of the corresponding qualitative property? Qualitative property can be

absent while the effect still occurs. Dennett argues that epiphenomenal mental properties, since they make no distinction is capable to cause emerging, or run 10 years behind, while everything else remain the same (Dennett, 1978, 252). My experience of excruciating pain happened 10 years ago and yet I now believe that I just experienced excruciating pain a moment ago. This is a dubious epistemic argument.

In response, Gadenne replied to this articulation of the gap problem. Qualia-epiphenomenalist adheres that the appearance of the physical cause necessitates the appearance of the supervening qualitative properties, so qualitative properties cannot be arbitrarily distributed. Rather, if the qualitative property is absent, or lags 10 year behind, then there will be some alteration to the physical cause as well, engendering some alteration to what effect occurs (Gadenne, 2006, 111).

The efficacious supervenience linkage guarantees that the effect will only occur when the epiphenomenal qualitative property does, so the epistemic credentials of epiphenomenalism are re-established. Typically, supervenience linkage are either metaphysically indispensable or nomologically relevant. The epiphenomenalist repudiates a metaphysically indispensable supervenience linkage.

If the physical cause metaphysically necessitates the qualitative properties that supervene upon the cause then there is no possible world where the physical cause emerges but the supervening qualitative properties do not. A number of epiphenomenalists concurred on Zombie argument or inverted qualia arguments insisting that the physical cause emerges without the supervening qualitative properties (Chalmers, 1996, 123). The epiphile repudiates the metaphysical indispensability of the mental properties. Several writers suggest that a metaphysically indispensable supervenience linkage is hardly differentiated from reductionism. The supervenience linkage is nomologically indispensable. But the epiphilic maintains that missing or inverted qualitative properties are metaphysically possible again, which reintroduces the aforementioned problem.

3. Robinson – Granting that these are nomologically distinct possible world where the belief/memory that 'I was in excruciating pain happens with the absence of actual pain, but in this world, under these laws, the belief/memory that 'I was in excruciating pain cannot possibly happen with the absence of the actual pain (Robinson, 2004, 168-169). The possibility of world in which laws are distinctive and a heightened degree of difficulty cognizing that they happen. If our belief/memory that we were in excruciating pain is indispensably preceded by the pain in this world, this re-establishes the epistemic merit of the belief/memory.

But Robinson's reply may not be efficacious.

1. The problem of the epistemic luck – A person spins/rotates until dizzy, points in some random direction and says Manila is in that direction, the belief could by chance be genuine, not because this true belief

stems from luck, it cannot be regarded as knowledge.

To evade epistemic luck, it is assumed that authentic beliefs must be justified as well, i.e., if Manila is in that specified direction must be grounded in an analysis of the local geography and familiarity with indispensable maps, this true belief can be tagged as knowledge. Pritchard suggests that epistemic luck's eliminative is a substantial condition on any theory of knowledge (Pritchard, 2005, 111). To this, Dancy upholds that knowledge must somehow do not depend on coincidence or luck (Dancy, 1985, 134).

2. Paradigm emerges to be question begging – for Robinson, in this world the belief that 'I was in excruciating pain' is preceded by a pain otherwise the belief that 'I was in excruciating pain' would not be authentic and would never be regarded as knowledge. For the belief that 'I was in excruciating pain' to be preceded by a pain, the psychophysical law must be heightened. How can we be sure that the appropriate law holds in this world? Humans lack the competence to introspect their own neural activity, so they cannot correlate the introspective qualitative state with specific neural activity. Even if humans acquired this competence, abstraction to law demands more than a single confirmed instances, confirming the law is indispensable through memory of prior instances. For epiphenomenalists, memory lacks causal efficacy so they cannot depend on the psychophysical law because the person remembers prior instances of this law happening, so, epiphenomenalist cannot be certain of the psychophysical law. If there is no certainty, then there is no probability to appeal to this law holding in this world as a foundation for cognizing that the qualitative state occurred.

To synthesize, if mental causation is authentic, then my pain causes my belief that 'I was in excruciating pain.' The linkage between the mental cause and the effect is immediate, so it renders the counterfactual. Had my pain not occurred, my belief that 'I was in excruciating pain' could not have occurred true. Consequentially, my belief that 'I was in excruciating pain' is genuine and justified knowledge. In contrast, on qualia-epiphenomenalism, my pain is caused by the cause of my belief that I was in pain. The linkage between the pain and the effect is indirect or mediated and hence it is probable to render the counterfactual. Had my pain not occurred, my belief that I was in excruciating pain would not have occurred false. So, the belief that I was in pain is an unjustified and possibly false belief. The epiphenomenalist responds to this charge by supposing that there is nomologically indispensable psychophysical law holding between the qualitative property and the appropriate belief. As the psychophysical law is only nomologically indispensable, it is probable that this law fails, which falsifies the indispensable counterfactual and dispel our knowledge of our qualitative states in doubt. Robinson answered that in this world, the belief that 'I was in excruciating pain' is authentic and is tagged as knowledge. But

the unreliable justificatory mechanism implies that the epistemic luck involved obstructs the belief for being tagged as knowledge even if it is authentic. The presumption that the appropriate psychophysical law maintains in this world is question begging. For the epiphenomenalist cannot exemplify that this is a world where the appropriate psychophysical law maintains. So appeal to the common underlying cause will not overcome the epistemic argument withstanding qualia-epiphenomenalism. Another strategy is indispensable to salvage qualia-epiphenomenalism for this epistemic argument.

## PHYSICAL EFFECT EPIPHENOMENALISM

With the exclusion of mental causes, the fusion of causal exclusion with physical causal completeness is indicative of having a substantial physical cause but not apparently a depiction that qualitative properties cannot cause mental effects. Some epiphenomenalists fosters that qualitative properties are epiphenomenal vis-à-vis physical effects, but causally efficacious vis-à-vis mental effects. If qualitative properties retain causal efficacy within their domain, then qualitative mental properties (i.e., pain) may cause mental effects (i.e., the belief that 'I was in excruciating pain'). If the belief that 'I was in excruciating pain' was caused by the pain, the belief that 'I was in excruciating pain' is justified knowledge, and the epistemic argument against qualia-epiphenomenalism dissipates.

Even if qualitative properties causally influence the instantiation of mental intentional properties (beliefs/memories), a query emerges whether these intentional properties are reducible to functional/physical properties or not. Philosophers such as Chalmers and Searle believed that qualitative properties and intentional properties are irreducible (Chalmers, 2003, 229, Searle, 2003, 155ff.). Beliefs about qualitative properties are partly constituted by those qualitative properties, as a functional/physical duplicate lacking the qualitative properties cannot have the same relief content.

Phenomenal realists hold that the phenomenal is conceptually irreducible to the physical and functional (Chalmers, 2003, 230). The intentional can be analyzed in functional terms. If rational properties are irreducible to the functional/physical then problem emerges: first, if qualitative properties can only cause intentional properties because intentional properties are irreducibly mental, intentional properties is not capable of causing behavioral effects for the same reason. Behavioral effects, such as waving/hand movement and utterances are physical effects. These physical effects constitute substantial physical cause, which, assuming the qualia-epiphenomenalist continues to adhere to physical causal completeness and causal exclusion, excludes those intentional properties causing this physical behavior. This springs to the unusual cause given that my unreduced belief that 'I was in excruciating pain' is tagged as knowledge but my utterance, 'I was in pain' is not knowledge because it was cause by neither the belief that I was in pain nor the pain itself. It also springs to the belief that I was in pain was caused by the pain itself, but the physical utterance 'ouch!' was not.

The epiphenomenalist concerns that mental properties are dependent upon and determined by physical properties.

The intentional property is determined by physical properties. There is no function left for the qualitative property to do. Epiphenomenalists suggest that qualitative properties causally contribute to the instantiation of reduced intentional properties. There is possibility that intentional properties reduce to the functional. So qualitative properties may causally influence these mental intentional properties. This is a solution to the non-reducible account of intentional properties. It guarantees that the belief that 'I was in excruciating pain' can cause the assertion 'I was in pain', since the belief is physical and can influence physical behavior. It also prevents the pain from m1 being pre-empted as a cause of m2 by the subvening physical base P2 since m2 is P2. Since pain caused the belief that I was in pain, the belief is justified and can be counted as knowledge. Epiphenomenalist argues that qualitative properties do not causally influence physical effects. If intentional properties are physical as this solution presumes, then qualitative properties will not be able to causally contribute to the occurrence of these physical intentional properties.

### HOW TO DO PHILOSOPHY

We reject the above mentioned common cause and the appeal to physical-effect phenomenalism stating that we have knowledge of our epiphenomenal qualitative properties by virtue of the fact that the physical properties that strongly subvene epiphenomenal qualitative properties cause the beliefs/memories that are appropriate to the epiphenomenal qualitative properties, we concur that this tactile fails because this relation between the qualitative properties and the belief/memories about the qualitative properties is indirect and hence it is possible to render the counterfactual "Had my pain not occurred my belief that I was in pain would not have occurred" false. If the belief/memories about the qualitative properties can occur without the qualitative properties having occurred, these beliefs/memories are unjustified and possibly false, are not considered knowledge. We consider physical-effect epiphenomenalism, according to which qualitative properties are epiphenomenal vis-à-vis physical effects but are efficacious vis-à-vis mental effects, so beliefs/memories about prior qualitative properties are justified.

We experienced pain and happiness. It occurred and we know it occurred. How is this related to our postmodern condition?

The postmodern condition is a result of the refusal of narratives to be subordinated to any other, a result of a great plurality of cultural systems not only in Asia but globally which claim for themselves their own legitimacy and would guard their autonomy jealously as to refuse to recognize any other center than their own. Postmodernity's centerless multiplicity of cultural entities all claiming equality and the right to be as they please in accordance with their own respective narrative legitimization, thus, proposing the unavoidability of pure difference or incommensurability. The crisis in academe need a reconceptualization if they are to cope with the onslaught of postmodernism. Interdisciplinary attempts to master the field, coercing it into intellectual performativity.

Our threshold for human experience is the question of meaning, i.e., lived experience. Experience is not simply immediate perception of reality, it is rather an assimilation of perceptions in which experience, thought and interpretation, and language run together in the same way as past, present, expectation and a challenge for the future in a culture with its worldview and in a society with its socio-political structures.

It fosters the retrieval of the strengths and riches of the cultural wisdom and genius of a people which may have been obscured by postmodernity.

Classroom discussion is an example of distributed thinking. Dialogue is a deliberative inquiry containing a definite effort at cognitive exploration on essential self-correctiveness fostering reflexivity. Education as inquiry begins with what students find problematical building upon what they continue to find interesting, intriguing, and important resulting to shared experiences and shared values communicating insights to one another, across differences in historical and social circumstances allowing them to be confident of their own self-identity vis-à-vis the identity of other seemingly dominant cultures.

The text-as-model technique and the community paradigm of deliberative inquiry pedagogy is a kind of schema, experience, thoughtfulness and imagination. Many disciplines conceive their own articulations as explanatory rather than argumentative. Reasoning and judgment add up to reasonableness: to be able to reason and be open to reason.

The formation of future teachers will have to keep in the forefront of its attention the role of the teacher as pedagogical expert, as model of reasoning and judgment and as model of cognitive self-defense.

### RESPONDENTS REACTIONS

1. The respondents concurred on the argument that the paradigm of experiences with qualia such as hallucinations, pain, hunger, itching, anger, envy or fear and moods, etc. consists qualitative aspects.
2. The respondents also concurred that qualia cannot be reduced to anything physical.
3. The respondents reacted on Descartes but only on the notion that the body is a material and the mind as an immaterial but declined the materialist assertion that everything that exists must be made of matter.
4. Concerning parapsychology, the students agreed that the consequences of mental abuse are beyond the laws of physics.
5. The respondents reacted on David Chalmers' argument on the *problems of consciousness* that though the solutions to these problems probably still require decades or even centuries of difficult empirical investigation, it can be solve. But as to how it can be solve is not yet clear to students. They are not sure whether cognitive science and neuroscience could do it.
6. Functionalism defines pain in terms of the causal role it plays in our mental life. Such a definition led to a zombie argument who consist the same functional role but without qualia. They also reacted to Ned Block's argument that it seems very odd to attribute qualia to the robot.
7. The respondents declined Frank Jackson's knowledge argument concerning his thought experiment for the simple reason that Mary, the brilliant scientist, was not able to fully comprehend the subjective experience of reacting and feeling to the color red.
8. The respondents accepted the idea that what it feels like experientially, to see a red rose is different from what it feels to see a white rose. Hearing a classical note played by a piano is different from hearing musical note played by a guitar.

9. About epiphenomenalism wherein the mental cannot influence the physical and mental events are caused by physical events but not vice versa, the respondents are confused. It is easier for them to accept interactionism wherein the mind and body influence each other or the mental can influence the physical. They are not also sure about parallelism wherein mental events and physical events are in a kind of continual harmony but neither causes the other.
10. Concerning monism: first, for idealism: only mind exists. Everything is mental. Second, physicalism (materialism): only the physical world exists. Everything is physical. Third, identity theory wherein the mental states are physical states of the brain. The argument are as follows: first, Mental states can cause physical events. Second, the physical world is causally closed. Third, therefore, mental states are physical states. Such a viewpoint were declined by the students. They reacted to this as some kind of telekinesis which is totally weird to them.
11. The respondents agreed with Chalmers on the following: people as behaving intelligently when they choose courses of action that are worthwhile to engendering their objectives and so they respond coherently and appropriated to query's that are presented to them, when they solve problems of lesser or greater difficulty, or when they create or design something significant, novel or anything alluding to aesthetics.
12. Since the neurochemical interactions in the central nervous system is experienced by the person that constitutes them, the subjectivity of what it is like to feel pain is implicitly expounded by the subjectivity of the neurochemical interactions in the central nervous system. Moreover, if neuro-qualia are identical with the neurochemical interactions, then neuro-qualia also contributes perspectival subjectivity as qualia did. Such argument by the neuroscientist is not clear to respondents as they have not yet understood the neurochemical interactions in the nervous system.
13. Daniel Dennett argument on the following: qualitative property can be absent while the effect still occurs. Dennett argues that epiphenomenal mental properties, since they make no distinction is capable to cause emerging, or run 10 years behind, while everything else remain the same. The respondents negated such argument on the possibility of experiencing excruciating pain that happened 10 years ago and the belief that the experience of excruciating pain occurred just a moment ago. Unless, they said, they are mentally ill or perhaps the consequence of experiencing excruciating pain and violence.
14. The respondents agreed that humans lack the competence to introspect their own neural activity, so they cannot correlate the introspective qualitative state with specific neural activity. Even if humans acquired this competence, abstraction to law demands more than a single confirmed instances, confirming the law is indispensable through memory of prior instances.

## CONCLUSION

Beliefs/memories on qualitative properties are unjustified by physical causes that efficaciously subvene correlating qualitative properties. Such indirect linkage between the belief and the qualitative property permits for the epistemically precarious scenario. The belief emerges with the absence of corresponding mental property. Nor are irreducible beliefs/memories on qualitative properties justified by fostering physical-effect epiphenomenalism. It stresses to the belief that irreducible beliefs/memories cannot cause their fitting behavioral effects or the standpoint that reducible beliefs/memories cannot be caused by qualitative properties.

Such responses to the epistemic argument are blocked but the epistemic argument will remain a powerful objection to qualia-epiphenomenalism leaving qualia-epiphenomenalists to consider several options: by attempting other method of resisting the epistemic argument or consider other solution to the mental causation problem that does not involve repudiating the principle of mental causation. Physical effect epiphenomenalism simply will not work.

Mental health/Education is both theoretically and empirically proven to be relevant in fighting crisis in life and promoting development. An increase of children's school attendance can reduce insecurity. The new perspective is that the contribution of a mentally educated society goes beyond the economic growth of a country, and does affect affirmatively on the life of people, especially that of the least advantaged. Investment is pivotal in education. The human development approach gives an additional justification for investing in mental health education. In rural areas, such policy must be adopted with a specific emphasis because of the dramatic incidence of illiteracy, food insecurity, and mortality in these places.

There is no discipline that is generally misunderstood and misconceived as being irrelevant to human society as philosophy. Some people erroneously envision philosophy as a discipline that is concerned only with abstract realities. For such people, philosophy has nothing to do with the real world. It is viewed as mere speculations that have no practical relevance. Some said that philosophy is a study in futility. Others are of the opinion that the study of philosophy, especially in our tertiary institution has no relevant value.

In several occasions, people got the negative impression that the students of philosophy are wasting their precious time in studying philosophy. Some non-students of philosophy do not understand what philosophy students do in their philosophy classes. Some people have negated philosophy on the ground that it plays no pivotal role to human life and the development of human society. In arguing how some people considered philosophy [1] observed that many men under the influence of science or practical affairs, are inclined to doubt whether philosophy is anything better than innocent but useless trifling, hairsplitting. Distinction and controversies on matters concerning which knowledge is impossible. The implication is that some people envision philosophy as practically useless. It has been observed that some people think of philosophy as a subject that solely deals with matters out of the world; [2] one thing that is very pertinent to note is that all the perspectives about philosophy as depicted above do not demonstrate what philosophy is. They only succeed in demonstrating what philosophy is not. The above perspectives are misconceptions of the nature of philosophy.

**RECOMMENDATIONS**

We experienced pain and happiness. It occurred and we know it occurred. But some people's view are totally different, which according to respondents, it also might happen to them especially if they are sick. Their taste changes, totally different from others. Even in seeing something, it also changes. Perhaps anything about external senses changes when a person is experiencing a sort of imbalance. In view of the foregoing, we recommend the following:

Every helping professionals, however, maintains a certain perspective in helping. We cannot have a theory of helping. I suggest an essence characterized by the term "equilibrium" or a state of adjustment between diverging influences or elements, a state of intellectual, emotional, physical and spiritual balance. Family therapy is the most powerful social therapeutic position for working with people. Out of the many sources of interaction that regularly impact upon all of us, family, peers, work, school, culture, the ecologically attuned helping professionals begins with the pivotal point which is the family. The family is the social environment out of which all emerge. It is the source of our most enduring relationships. The family frequently has the most enduring resources, physical and emotional, with which to facilitate transformations. Of all of the social systems affecting us all, changes in the family are frequently paramount. Depicted from family therapy perspective, the impact of pain, happiness, illness, crisis and other individual contentions upon other family members engenders transparency.

Changes in basic family structures influences all family members. We are all extremely vulnerable to changes within our family. The focus on interactions among significant people in our times, our family members and ourselves is the first source of family therapy's power. It allows us as helping professionals to visualize the cause of problems as circular. The family system is a self-reinforcing circle of interactions where all contribute to the circumstances present. Helping professionals considers the interactions among all parts of the family system as indispensable. It is further distinguished by the inclusion of all relevant persons seeking to endeavor with their mutual/actual interactions as the focus for therapy. When all the significant players are present, the helping professionals can see their patterns of interaction firsthand, intervene immediately, observe change, and gauge the actual success of therapeutic effects. The power of family therapy is deduced from the concept of multifaceted functioning. All families as well as individual family members constitutes multiple facets of themselves they can articulate. Family therapy does not ignore pain and illness but rather balances them within a view that all families and their members inherently have resources. Those characteristics among family members that fosters coping and survival, limit destructive patterns, and enrich daily life.

Equilibrium family therapy fosters a construal of human functioning and a direction for the therapeutic process. The configuration are as follows: first, the helping professional conceptualizes problems as being both between people and within them; second, the goals of therapy constitutes both transforming relationships and individuals; third, the helping professional views his or her ethical responsibility as extending both to the individual clients presenting with a problem and to all persons in relationship with the clients who will be indispensably affected by therapeutic interventions; and finally, greater balance among problems and family strengths and resources depicts the ongoing goal of therapeutic process.

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